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Abstract 
People are prejudiced towards groups they perceive as having a worldview dissimilar 
from their own. This link between perceived attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice is so stable 
that it has been described as a psychological law (Byrne, 1969). The current research tests 
whether reducing people’s (over-)confidence in their own understanding of policies by 
puncturing their illusion of explanatory depth in the political domain will reduce the link between 
perceived attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice. In an initial pre-registered experiment (N = 
296), we did not find support for our hypothesis, but exploratory analyses indicated that the 
hypothesized effect occurred for political moderates (but not for people who identified as strong 
liberals/conservatives). However, despite successfully manipulating people’s understanding of 
policies, in the main study (N = 492) we did not replicate the result of the initial experiment. We 
suggest potential explanations for our results and discuss future directions for research on 
breaking the link between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice. 
 
Keywords: dissimilarity; prejudice; illusion of explanatory depth; political psychology; attitudes 
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I know that I know nothing - Can puncturing the illusion of explanatory depth overcome 
the relationship between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice? 
 
"We only have one remaining bigotry. We don't want to be around anybody who 
disagrees with us" (Bill Clinton, 2014) 
As former US president Bill Clinton recognized, people are prejudiced towards groups 
characterized by a worldview they see as different from their own (Brandt, 2017; Brandt, Reyna, 
Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014; Chambers, Schlenker, & Collison, 2013; Crawford & 
Pilanski, 2014). Indeed, this link between perceiving a group as having dissimilar social and 
political attitudes, and expressions of prejudice (i.e. negative evaluations based on group 
membership2, Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002) is so robust that is has been referred to as a 
psychological “law” (Byrne, 1969; Byrne & Nelson, 1965). Even people who are open to new 
experiences are prejudiced towards social groups they perceive as holding dissimilar social and 
political beliefs (Brandt, Chambers, Crawford, Wetherell, & Reyna, 2015). These prejudices are 
consequential, as they prevent resolutions of socially and culturally divisive issues, and can lead 
to discriminatory and aggressive behavior (Cox & Devine, 2014; cf. Chambers & Melnyk, 2006; 
Wynn, 2016). 
Despite its social importance, developing interventions that break or reduce the link 
between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice is challenging. While social psychologists have 
identified a number of ways to reduce prejudice – for example, work inspired by the contact 
hypothesis (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) – these methods have often focused on improving specific 
                                                             
2 This definition is a well-accepted definition of prejudice (Brandt & Proulx, 2016; Brown, 2010; Crandall, 
Ferguson, & Bahns, 2013; Stangor, 2009). While it is focused on the central psychological feature of prejudice (i.e. 
negative affect), this definition does not say anything about the appropriateness or justifiability of any given 
prejudice. 
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intergroup relationships by (1) highlighting the similarities between groups or (2) emphasizing 
the distinctiveness of the group while creating commonalities between groups (Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 1999). First, contact between outgroup members can lead to less prejudice by 
transforming the cognitive representations of outgroup members as being closer to the in-group 
or closer to the self, and, thus, more similar to the self (Cameron, Rutland, Brown, & Douch, 
2006; Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, & Murrell, 1990; cf. Stathi, Cameron, Hartley, & Bradford, 
2014). Second, research has indicated that distinctiveness between subgroups can actually foster 
more positive intergroup attitudes under certain conditions (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). For 
example, multiculturalism explicitly marks group differences as positive, but emphasizes 
simultaneously how the different groups can contribute to a common larger group (e.g. society; 
Park & Judd, 2005). 
What is not clear is how to break the link between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice 
without directly altering the perceived attitudinal dissimilarity and without creating a common 
group-identity. This kind of intervention is important, because creating attitudinal similarity in 
some domains is not possible, or at the very least difficult (e.g., political differences are 
characterized by worldview dissimilarity and it is difficult to change political beliefs). Similarly, 
creating a common goal (e.g. contributing to society) is not straightforward in the political 
context, because liberals and conservatives often have fundamentally different ideas about how 
and what groups should contribute to society (e.g. Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). The goal of 
the current study was to test whether the link between perceived attitudinal dissimilarity and 
prejudice can be weakened or even overcome when people are reminded that they do not fully 
understand policies related to their political attitudes. 
Attitudinal Dissimilarity, Prejudices, and the Illusion of Explanatory Depth 
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It is well known that people express prejudice towards others with different attitudes and 
opinions compared to their own. Existing literature suggests that this effect occurs for two basic 
reasons. The first is as part of humans’ coalition detection system (Amodio, 2014; Boyer, Firat, & 
van Leeuwen, 2015; Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001). According to this research, people 
have an evolved capacity for identifying friends and foes. This capacity relies on social cues. 
These can include ethnicity, but also political beliefs. People use these cues automatically to 
identify who belongs to which group (Pietraszewski, Curry, Petersen, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
2015). People who are perceived as holding dissimilar political beliefs are then flagged as foes 
and, thus, met with prejudice. The second is a reaction to incongruity (Brandt et al, 2014, 2015; 
Byrne, 1969; Crawford, 2014; Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, & O’Brien, 1995). People desire to 
understand the world and encountering people whose attitudes and opinions violate that 
understanding frustrates that goal. In response, people derogate those with different attitudes and 
values in an attempt to bolster the validity of their own way of viewing the world. 
A third possibility, that we consider here, is that people are overconfident about the 
validity/correctness of their attitudes, opinions, and worldviews. People who are overconfident in 
their own opinions are then more likely to believe that others with different attitudes are wrong. 
Thus, people who are overconfident think that they have reasons to be prejudiced towards others 
with dissimilar views. In general, people who are confident about their attitudes are often less 
likely to change their attitudes in the face of disconfirming evidence (Bassili, 1996; Tormala & 
Petty, 2002). However, when it comes to politics, it is not just that people are confident in their 
attitudes, but they are also overly confident with regard to their understanding of policies and 
how the policies will work (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, & Sloman, 2013). This is an instance of the 
illusion of explanatory depth, where “people feel they understand the world with far greater 
detail, coherence, and depth than they really do” (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002, p. 522). When this 
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illusion of explanatory depth is punctured, however, by asking people to explain in detail how a 
particular public policy works, people’s levels of political extremity drop (Fernbach et al., 2013). 
In short, explaining the mechanism underlying public policies is very difficult and often makes 
people realize that they do not understand the policy as well as they thought. This reduces their 
confidence in their understanding of these policies and the extremity of their attitudes. 
Bringing together ideas and methods from existing literature on the illusion of 
explanatory depth, and on the link between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice, we aimed to 
test the following hypothesis: Reducing people’s (over-)confidence in their own understanding of 
policies by puncturing their illusion of explanatory depth in the political domain should reduce 
the link between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice. This intervention is unique in that it aims 
to reduce prejudice towards dissimilar groups without changing the view that the other group has 
a different worldview and/or different goals for society, but by making people more willing to 
accept this worldview dissimilarity. 
Initial Study 
 We conducted an initial pre-registered experiment to test this idea (see supplementary 
materials for details).3 In short, we combined the methods used to examine the link between 
attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice (Brandt et al., 2015) with the methods used to understand 
explanatory depth and extreme political attitudes (Fernbach et al., 2013; see also Rozenblit & 
Keil 2002). Participants rated how dissimilar 20 groups were in terms of holding social and 
political attitudes different from their own, described either their reasons for their position on 
three political policies (control condition) or the causal mechanisms behind the three policies 
                                                             
3 The pre-registration (including hypotheses and analysis plan), the materials, the data, and the analysis script for the 
initial study can be found here: https://osf.io/nbrww/ (pre-registration) and https://osf.io/wksmy/ (data and analysis 
script). Minor errors in the pre-registered analysis script were identified and corrected during performing the actual 
analysis (the differences are described here: https://osf.io/78knx/). 
I KNOW THAT I KNOW NOTHING   7 
(experimental condition), and then completed prejudice measures for the same 20 groups. We 
hypothesized that participants in the experimental condition would have a weaker association 
between perceived attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice than people in the control condition. 
Our hypothesis was not supported. Exploratory analyses, however, identified a more nuanced 
picture. We found that the experimental condition – where we punctured the illusion of 
explanatory depth – reduced the attitudinal dissimilarity-prejudice association for political 
moderates, but not for participants identifying as conservative or liberal. Here we aimed to dig 
into this potential moderator.4  
Potential Moderator: Ideological Extremity 
Ideological extremity vs. moderation may moderate the effect of our manipulation for at 
least two reasons. First, political moderates are less likely to see their positions as superior 
(Brandt, Evans, & Crawford, 2015; Toner, Leary, Asher, & Jongman-Sereno, 2013) and to 
moralize political issues (Ryan, 2014). Moral convictions are a strong predictor of hostility 
towards others who disagree with them (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005) and they are also 
resistant to change and the influence of others (Aramovich, Lytle, & Skitka, 2012; Skitka, 
Bauman, & Lytle, 2009; Wisneski, Lytle, & Skitka, 2009; see also Colombo, Bucher, & Inbar, 
2016). Therefore, it may be easier to change moderates’ minds because the moral barrier that any 
manipulation of the illusion of explanatory depth needs to overcome is likely to be less strong for 
people with a moderate political ideology than for people with a more extreme ideology. 
Second, moderates are more tolerant of political ambiguity than political extremists are. 
That is, they have less problems to accept compromises and are more willing to remain 
                                                             
4 Our initial study also indicated that the experimental condition might even increase the strength of the dissimilarity-
prejudice relationship for strong conservatives (but not for moderate conservatives or liberals). However, we think 
that this finding is less likely to be replicated as (a) we do not have good theoretical reasons to believe that this effect 
should occur and (b) the number of strong conservatives in both conditions was very low (9 strong conservatives in 
each writing task condition). Nonetheless, the current design allows us to test whether this effect replicates. 
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undecided or to accept multiple perspectives to the same issue (McClosky & Chong, 1985). 
Moderates also see the political world in less stark, black and white terms (Lammers, Koch, 
Conway, & Brandt, 2016; Tetlock, 1984) than people with a more extreme political ideology do. 
Being confronted with one’s lack of understanding of policies and the related thought that then 
one’s prejudices towards dissimilar groups may be less justified is likely to create ambiguity; it 
weakens the positions that one has held so far and creates more possibilities for alternative 
solutions. If moderates are better able to accept this ambiguity, they may be willing to update 
their previous beliefs and, thus, might be more likely to change their prejudices compared to 
political extremists. 
The Current Research 
Figure 1 summarizes the model. The main goal of the current research was to test if 
puncturing the illusion of explanatory depth reduces the association between perceived attitudinal 
dissimilarity and prejudice for political moderates. In order to test this prediction, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two writing task conditions (explaining the mechanisms 
underlying different policies versus generating reasons for one’s position on the policies; using 
the same instruction as in the initial study and as in Fernbach et al., 2013). We predicted that the 
positive association between perceived attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice towards social 
groups would be smaller in the mechanism explanation condition than in the reason generation 
condition because the mechanism explanation task would puncture the illusion of explanatory 
depth. However, we expected that this effect would only occur for political moderates, but not for 
people with a more extreme political ideology. 
An additional goal of this research was to examine potential mechanisms underlying this 
effect. We predicted that the moderation effect of ideological extremity might be driven by two 
features that distinguish moderates from the political extreme: (a) their weaker inclination to  
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Figure 1: Three-way Interaction Effect of Perceived Attitudinal Dissimilarity, 
Manipulation of Explanatory Depth, and Extremity of Political Ideology on Prejudice as 
Mediated by Strength of Moral Convictions and Tolerance of Political Ambiguity 
 
moralize political issues and (b) their higher acceptance of political ambiguity. Therefore, our 
design included measures for both strength of moral convictions and tolerance of political 
ambiguity to examine these mediation predictions. The pre-registration (including hypotheses and 
analysis plan), the materials, the data, and the analysis script for this study can be found here: 
https://osf.io/etwq9/ (pre-registration) and https://osf.io/29qmy/ (data and analysis script). Minor 
errors in the pre-registered analysis script were identified and corrected during performing the 
actual analysis (the differences are described here: https://osf.io/tgxec/). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from across the Unites States using Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and received a payment for their participation ($1/participant). We conducted a power analysis5 
                                                             
5 We thank Jake Westfall for his advice on the best way to conduct the power analysis.  
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with PANGEA (Westfall, 2016). This analysis suggested that we should collect about 500 
participants who rate dissimilarity and prejudice for 30 social groups. This sample size gives us 
approximately 83% power to detect a small effect size (d = 0.20) and approaching 100 % power 
to detect the mean effect size in social psychology (d = 0.45; Westfall, 2016, based on Richard, 
Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003). A more detailed description for our power analysis rationale can 
be found in the supplementary materials. 
Our initial sample size was n = 808. Participants with the same IP address (n = 69) were 
removed from the data set (we kept only the first case), as were people who did not complete the 
study (n = 247).6 Of these 247 participants, 1 person exited the study before they were assigned 
to a condition. When participants were assigned to a condition, significantly more participants did 
not complete the survey in the mechanism explanation condition than in the reason generation 
condition (41 % vs. 25 %), c2(1) = 20.75, p < .001. This finding indicates that the dropout rate in 
the mechanism explanation condition was significantly higher than in the reason generation 
condition (further discussed in the Discussion section). Our final sample consisted of 492 
participants (275 in the reason generation condition and 217 in the mechanism explanation 
condition), of which 274 people identified as male, 215 as female, and 3 as other. The average 
age amounted to 36.03 (SD = 11.71). While we prepared the manuscript for re-submission and 
double-checked the fit with the preregistration, we realized the discrepancy between our final 
sample size of n = 492 and our statement in the preregistration that we would collect participants 
until we reached a sample size of n = 500. However, given a time difference of roughly 2.5 
months between data collection and the detection of this difference, we decided in consultation 
with the Associate Editor to proceed with the given sample size of n = 492. 
                                                             
6 Not completing the study means here that a participant does not have a single valid response for at least one of our 
variables of interest. 
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Procedure 
We used a between-subjects design with two different conditions (writing task: 
explanation of mechanisms vs. generation of reasons).7 For all participants, the experiment 
consisted of five parts. In the first part, participants rated the perceived attitudinal dissimilarity of 
30 groups. In the second part, participants completed measures of the two potential mediators: 
moral convictions and tolerance of ambiguity. The third part consisted of a writing task, in which 
participants were randomly assigned to either describe the mechanisms behind three policies in as 
much detail as possible (mechanism explanation condition) or to generate reasons for their 
position on three policies (reason generation condition). In the fourth part, participants’ 
completed measures of prejudice towards the 30 groups. In the final part, participants were asked 
demographic questions, including a measure of their political ideology, the proposed moderator 
in our analysis. Afterwards, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Materials 
We aimed to test the relationship between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice for a 
representative sample of groups that was balanced with regard to the perceived political ideology 
of the groups (a list of these groups is available in the Appendix). In order to do so, we used 30 
frequently named social groups in the US (cf. Koch, Imhoff, Dotsch, Unkelbach, & Alves, 2016).  
We started by including the 30 most frequently named social groups (see Koch et al., 2016, Table 
1). However, this collection of groups was slightly liberally skewed (M = 55.11 using the ratings 
provided by Koch et al. on a conservative-liberal-scale from 0 to 100). Therefore, we replaced the 
                                                             
7 In the initial study, we also had a factor that manipulated the order in which the writing task and the dissimilarity 
ratings took place (see supplementary materials). In one condition, the writing task followed the dissimilarity ratings. 
In another condition, the writing task preceded the dissimilarity ratings. We included this factor initially in order to 
examine whether the explanatory depth manipulation significantly influences participants’ dissimilarity ratings. We 
found it did not. This finding also has implications for the possibility that a common rater bias may influence our 
findings. As the writing task can be taxing in terms of time and thinking,  the lack of a significant difference between 
the two order conditions suggests that having time and thought between the two types of ratings does not 
significantly affect the results. Therefore, we dropped this order manipulation from the current study. 
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least frequently named from these 30 social groups, which are liberal (≥ 60 rating on Koch et al.’s 
0-100 scale), by the most frequently named non-chosen social groups, which are conservative (≤ 
40 rating on Koch et al.’s 0-100 scale), until the mean perceived ideology of the groups was 
balanced (M = 49.87). Specifically, we replaced goths with preps, children with elderly, teachers 
with business people, and gays with white collar. Thus, the groups we used were both diverse and 
balanced with regard to their perceived political ideology. 
Independent Variable: Perceived Attitudinal Dissimilarity. Perceived attitudinal 
dissimilarity was measured for each target group with the following item: “Please indicate the 
extent to which you see each of the following groups as holding political or social beliefs 
different from your own”. Participants answered on a slider scale from 1 (not at all different from 
me) to 7 (very different from me) with 4 as default (Brandt et al., 2015). The order of the groups 
was randomized for each participant. 
Mediators: Strength of Moral Conviction and Tolerance of Political Ambiguity. We 
proposed two mediators for the moderation effect of political extremity on the association 
between perceived attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice: the strength of moral convictions and 
tolerance of ambiguity. Moral convictions were measured for each of the three policies the 
participants selected with the following item: “How much are your feelings about the following 
policies connected to your core moral beliefs or convictions?” on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much) (based on Skitka et al., 2005). The scores for the three items were averaged to form a 
strength of moral convictions composite such that higher values indicate stronger moral 
convictions. The mean on the recoded scale from 0 to 1 was 0.77 (SD = 0.18). 
Intolerance of political ambiguity was measured with an adapted version of the 
Intolerance of Ambiguity scale (McClosky & Chong, 1985, OVS items in Table 6). We slightly 
changed the wording of the items to use rating scales rather than binary choices as the response 
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format. The adapted scale consisted of four items (e.g., “On important public issues, you should 
always keep in mind that there is more than one side to most issues”, reverse-scored) answered 
on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The scores for the four items were 
recoded and averaged to form an intolerance of political ambiguity composite such that higher 
values indicate more intolerance of political ambiguity. As the reliability coefficient was low for 
this scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .39), the results involving intolerance of political ambiguity should 
be treated with caution. The mean on the recoded scale from 0 to 1 was 0.34 (SD = 0.16). 
Moderator 1: Explanatory Depth Manipulation. With regard to the writing task factor, 
participants went through either a manipulation designed to decrease their self-rated 
understanding of policies, or through a control condition. Note that while our methodology is 
consistent with earlier work on the illusion of explanatory depth for artifacts (Rozenblit & Keil, 
2002), we used the modified version designed by Fernbach and colleagues (2013), who focused 
on public policies. First, participants selected the three political issues that they find most 
important from a list of ten issues. The list of political issues included five of the policies used by 
Fernbach and colleagues and five additional policies that are relatively specific and of current 
relevance.8 We included more policies than Fernbach and colleague and asked the participants to 
choose their three most important issues to ensure that participants realized that their lack of 
understanding of policies applies to topics they care about. Afterwards, participants rated their 
position on each of the three chosen issues on a scale from 1 (strongly against) to 7 (strongly in 
favor). In addition, participants rated their understanding of the policies on a scale from 1 (vague 
                                                             
8 In the initial study, we used all six policies provided by Fernbach and colleagues (2013) and added four new 
policies. However, the results showed that for one of the six original policies and one of the newly included policies, 
there was no decrease in understanding at all in the mechanism explanation condition (cf. Table SM.1 in the 
supplementary materials). Therefore, these two policies were replaced by two new policies. 
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understanding) to 7 (thorough understanding). We used the original instructions from Fernbach et 
al. (2013) to explain the scale and the different levels of understanding. 
Next, participants were randomly assigned to either a mechanism explanation writing task 
condition or a reason generation writing task condition. These conditions were nearly identical to 
the conditions used by Fernbach et al (2013), with only minor changes to accommodate the  
changes of our study (e.g., selection of three important issues). In the mechanism explanation 
condition, participants were asked to describe all the details they know about a policy, going from 
the first step to the last, and providing the causal connection between the steps. In the reason 
generation condition, participants were asked to write down all the reasons they have for their 
position on a policy, going from the most important to the least. In both conditions, participants 
went through the task for each of the three chosen policies and rated their understanding of the 
policy again directly afterwards using the same scale as above. The mechanism explanation 
writing task was expected to decrease participants’ understanding ratings, while the reason 
generation writing task was not expected to affect the understanding ratings (Fernbach et al., 
2013). 
Dependent variable: Prejudice. Our dependent variable, prejudice, was measured with 
three items: disliking, preferred social distance to, and perceived immorality of the target groups.9 
The first two items reflect common measures of prejudices while addressing different 
components, namely affect and behavioral intentions (Brandt et al., 2015), while perceived 
immorality is an important dimension of the perception of others (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 
2014; Skitka et al., 2005). We assessed disliking with a feeling thermometer slider rating on a 
scale from 0 (very cold, dislike quite a lot) to 100 (very warm, like quite a lot) with a default of 
                                                             
9 In the initial study, we used a restriction of rights as third item (cf. Crawford, 2014; see supplementary materials). 
However, as this item was highly skewed and did not correlate strongly with the other two items, it was replaced in 
the current study. 
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50 (reverse scored). Social distance was measured with one item reading, “how willing would 
you be to occasionally spend social time with a person who is part of the following groups?”, 
answered on a slider scale from 1 (not at all willing) to 7 (very willing) with a default of 4 
(reverse scored) (Brandt et al., 2015). Perceived immorality was assessed with a similar slider 
rating as dislike, but with different anchors – ranging from 0 (ultimate evil) to 100 (ultimate 
good) with a default of 50 (reverse scored). The order of the three questions and the order of the 
groups for which the ratings were made were randomized. We specified a priori that, if the 
prejudice indicators were highly intercorrelated (Cronbach’s alpha ≥ .7), the items would be 
combined into a prejudice composite. Otherwise, we would conduct separate analyses for the 
different items. As Cronbach’s alpha was 0.83, the three items were averaged to form a prejudice 
composite. 
Moderator 2: Extremity of Political Ideology. In the last part of the questionnaire, 
participants filled out a short demographic questionnaire including a measure of their political 
ideology. Political ideology was measured with a single item reading, “generally speaking, do 
you usually think of yourself as conservative, moderate, or liberal?”, answered on a scale from -5 
(very conservative) to 0 (moderate) to 5 (very liberal). Ideological extremity was then computed 
as the absolute value of this measure, so that it ranged from 0 (moderate) to 5 (extremist). In 
addition, participants’ ideological type was computed as following: -1 for conservatives (< 0 on 
the ideology measure), 0 for moderates (= 0 on the ideology measure), 1 for liberals (> 0 on the 
ideology measure).10 The sample was quite balanced with regard to ideological extremity (M = 
                                                             
10 The trichotomy of the continuous ideology measure may initially seem like a strange choice. However, when we 
include the interaction between extremity and ideology type in our models, the interaction term recreates the 
continuous measure. This approach has the added benefit of separating out the effect of ideology type from ideology 
extremity and telling us if the effects of extremity have different effects for liberals and conservatives. 
I KNOW THAT I KNOW NOTHING   16 
2.53, SD = 1.81), but included more liberals (n = 263) than moderates (n = 113) and 
conservatives (n = 116). 
Covariates (for robustness check analysis). The demographic questionnaire also 
included measures of gender, age, and education, which were included as covariates in an 
additional robustness check analysis (see below). Gender was measured by asking participants to 
“please indicate your gender”. Participants could identify as male, female, or other (and specify 
how they identified). Age was measured with a single item reading, “please indicate your age”, 
on an open response scale. Education was measured with a single item reading, “what is the 
highest level of school that you have completed?” and five response categories: less than high 
school; high school diploma / GED; some college; Bachelor's degree; postgraduate (Master's 
degree, Ph.D., professional degree). The mean response amounted to 3.57 (SD = 0.88). 
Results 
We used multilevel analyses to test our hypotheses. For all multilevel analyses discussed 
in this paper, we used the lmer function of the lmerTest package in R (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & 
Christensen, 2016). Further, we used one-tailed tests to test all directional hypotheses that we 
specified a priori. 
Preregistered Analyses 
Manipulation Check: Change in Understanding Ratings (Preregistered). For our 
study, it is essential that the participants in the mechanism explanation condition (but not in the 
reason generation condition) realize that their understanding of the policies is worse than they 
expected. That is, we hypothesized to replicate Fernbach et al.’s finding that the mechanism 
explanation task leads to a reduced understanding of the policies compared to the reason 
generation task. To test this, we conducted a multilevel analysis with two different levels. Level 2 
was constituted by the subjects and Level 1 was constituted by the issues. We conducted analyses 
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with three different dependent variables: a) the understanding rating at time 1 (higher ratings 
indicating better understanding), b) the difference score of the two understanding ratings after 
and before the manipulation (higher ratings indicating improved understanding), and c) the 
understanding rating at time 2 (higher ratings indicating better understanding). We included a 
fixed effect for writing task condition (reason generation task coded as -0.5, mechanism 
explanation task coded as 0.5) and a random intercept. 
We did not expect any differences in the understanding ratings before the writing task 
manipulation. Indeed, the effect of writing task condition was not significant, b = -0.06, SE = 
0.10, t(490) = -0.58, p = .559. This result indicates that there were no significant differences 
between the two conditions with regard to the understanding of the policies before the writing 
task. 
We expected that understanding ratings would decrease in the mechanism explanation 
condition, but not in the reason generation condition. This prediction was supported by the data. 
The effect of writing task condition on change in understanding ratings was significant, b = -0.32, 
SE = 0.07, t(490) = -4.53, p < .001 (one-tailed). In the mechanism explanation condition, there 
was a significant decrease in understanding, b = -0.24, SE = 0.05, t(490) = -4.65, p < .001 (one-
tailed), while in the reason generation condition, there was no significant change in understanding 
ratings, b = 0.07, SE = 0.05, t(490) = 1.58, p = .114. These results indicate that participants 
realized that their understanding was not as good as they thought in the mechanism explanation 
condition, but not in the reason generation condition. 
The understanding ratings after the writing task manipulation were significantly lower in 
the mechanism explanation condition than in the reason generation condition, b = -0.38, SE = 
0.12, t(490) = -3.21, p = .001. Thus, we can reasonably conclude that our manipulation of 
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reducing people’s confidence in their understanding of political issues in the experimental 
condition was successful. 
Main analysis: The effect of the explanatory depth manipulation on the attitudinal 
dissimilarity-prejudice association moderated by extremity of political ideology 
(Preregistered). The main hypothesis in our study is that puncturing the illusion of explanatory 
depth decreases the strength of the relationship between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice for 
moderates but not for people who identify strongly as liberal or conservative. That is, we 
predicted that, for political moderates, the positive association between attitudinal dissimilarity 
and prejudices will be smaller in the mechanism explanation writing task condition than in the 
reason generation writing task condition. Conversely, we did not expect a difference in the 
attitudinal dissimilarity-prejudice relationship between mechanism explanation writing task 
condition and reason generation writing task condition for people with an extreme political 
ideology.  
In order to test our hypothesis, we conducted a multilevel analysis with two different 
levels. Level 2 was constituted by the subjects and Level 1 was constituted by the 30 social 
groups that we used for our measures of attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudices. We included the 
prejudice composite as dependent variable (rescaled to range from 0 to 1, higher ratings 
indicating more prejudice). In addition, we included fixed effects for (a) attitudinal dissimilarity 
(first rescaled to range from 0 to 1, then person mean-centered), (b) writing task condition (reason 
generation task coded as -0.5, mechanism explanation task coded as 0.5), (c) ideological 
extremity (the absolute value of the political ideology variable, ranging from 0 to 5, higher 
ratings indicating a more extreme political ideology), and (d) type of ideology (conservative 
coded as -1, moderate coded as 0, and liberal coded as 1). Further, we included fixed effects for 
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all two-, three- and four-way interactions between these variables and their interaction as well as 
a random intercept and a random slope for the effect of attitudinal dissimilarity. 
The main effect of attitudinal dissimilarity was expected to be positive representing the 
robust finding of past research that individuals express more prejudices towards groups that are 
perceived as being more dissimilar. Our main hypothesis was then that an interaction effect of 
attitudinal dissimilarity, writing task condition, and ideological extremity emerges indicating that 
the effect of attitudinal dissimilarity is weaker in the mechanism explanation condition than in the 
reason generation condition for moderates but not for participants with an extreme political 
ideology. Notably, our analysis also allowed us to examine whether the results differ for liberal 
extremists and conservative extremists. This would be indicated by a significant four-way 
interaction effect. In the initial study, we found some evidence for such a pattern although we 
think it is less likely to be replicated (see footnote 3). Indeed, when we included a main effect of 
ideological type and its two-, three- and four-way interaction terms with the other three variables 
in our model, these effects were non-significant (all ps > .066). Thus, we removed these effects 
from our final model. 
The analysis does not support our main hypothesis. The three-way interaction effect of 
attitudinal dissimilary, writing task condition, and ideological extremity was not significant, b = 
0.01, SE = 0.02, t(466) = 0.33, p = .371 (one-tailed). As specified in our pre-registration, we 
nonetheless probed the effect of attitudinal dissimilarity for moderates and extremists in the two 
experimental conditions. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the analysis for moderates did not provide evidence for the 
effectiveness of the writing task condition in influencing the association between attitudinal  
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Figure 2: The Unstandardized Beta (and 95% Confidence Intervals) of Perceived 
Attitudinal Dissimilarity on Prejudice Depending on Writing Task Condition and Ideological 
Extremity in the Main Study 
 
dissimilarity and prejudice. The two-way interaction effect of attitudinal dissimilarity and writing 
task condition was in the expected direction, but non-significant, b = -0.03, SE = 0.05, t(480) = -
0.57, p = .284 (one-tailed). For moderates in the reason generation condition, the effect of 
attitudinal dissimilarity was strong and significant, b = 0.26, SE = 0.04, t(480) = 7.03, p < .001. 
For moderates in the mechanism explanation condition, the effect of attitudinal dissimilarity was  
also strong and significant, b = 0.23, SE = 0.04, t(481) = 5.89, p < .001. It is clear from Figure 2 
that these two simple effects are similar in size in both experimental conditions. 
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There was also no evidence for an effect of our writing task manipulation on the 
relationship between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice for political extremists. The two-way 
interaction effect of attitudinal dissimilarity and writing task condition was not significant, b = -
0.00, SE = 0.05, t(453) = -0.05, p = .957. For extremists in the reason generation condition, the 
effect of attitudinal dissimilarity was strong and significant, b = 0.41, SE = 0.03, t(454) = 12.30, p 
< .001. For extremists in the mechanism explanation condition, the effect of attitudinal 
dissimilarity was also strong and significant, b = 0.40, SE = 0.04, t(451) = 10.61, p < .001. It is 
clear from Figure 2 that these two simple effects are similar in size in both experimental 
conditions. 
Mediation model (Preregistered). We hypothesized that the difference in the 
effectiveness of puncturing the illusion of explanatory depth between political moderates and 
extremists is driven by (a) the weaker moral convictions of political moderates and (b) the higher 
tolerance of political ambiguity of political moderates. Although our pre-registration stated that 
we would not conduct the mediation analyses without first finding the predicted three-way 
interaction, we decided to conduct the analyses to give a full presentation of the results. 
In order to test these predictions, we carried out multilevel mediation analysis (Zhang, 
Zyphur, & Preacher, 2009). In the first step, we conducted two OLS regression analyses and (a) 
regressed strength of moral convictions (averaged across issues) on ideological extremity and (b) 
regressed intolerance of political ambiguity on ideological extremity. In the second step, we 
included the proposed mediators in the multilevel model that we used for our main analyses. For 
each mediator, we included its main effect as well as interaction effects with perceived attitudinal 
dissimilarity and the writing task condition. 
With regard to the first step, our mediation hypotheses predicted that ideological 
extremity has a positive and significant effect on (a) strength of moral convictions and (b) 
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intolerance of political ambiguity. With regard to the second step, our mediation hypotheses 
predicted that the three-way interaction effect involving attitudinal dissimilarity, writing task 
condition, and extremity of ideology is reduced (and potentially become nonsignificant). In 
contrast, we expected that (a) the three-way interaction effect involving attitudinal dissimilarity, 
writing task condition, and strength of moral conviction and/or (b) the three-way interaction 
effect involving attitudinal dissimilarity, writing task condition, and intolerance of political 
ambiguity are significant. We expected that follow-up analysis show then that the effect of 
attitudinal dissimilarity is reduced in the mechanism explanation condition compared to the 
reason generation condition for people with weaker moral convictions and/or people who are less 
intolerant of political ambiguity. In contrast, we did not expect such an effect for people with 
stronger moral convictions and people who are more intolerant of political ambiguity. 
Significance tests for indirect effects were conducted with the Sobel test (Preacher & Leonardelli, 
2001). Recent methodological research has suggested that indirect effect can be significant even 
if the total effect is not significant (Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011). 
Step 1. As predicted, we found that ideological extremity was positively and significantly 
associated with participants’ strength of moral convictions, b = 0.02, SE = 0.00, t(490) = 4.70, p 
< .001 (one-tailed). However, ideological extremity was not significantly related to intolerance of 
political ambiguity, b = 0.01, SE = 0.00, t(490) = 1.51, p = .066 (one-tailed). 
Step 2. We did not find evidence that the attitudinal dissimilarity × writing task condition 
interaction effect depended on the strength of participants’ moral convictions. The three-way 
interaction of attitudinal dissimilarity, writing task condition, and strength of moral convictions 
was not in the predicted direction and not significant, b = -0.04, SE = 0.17, t(469) = -0.22, p = 
.587 (one-tailed).  
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In contrast, we did find evidence that this interaction effect depended on participants’ 
levels of intolerance of political ambiguity. The three-way interaction of attitudinal dissimilarity, 
writing task condition, and intolerance of political ambiguity was in the predicted direction and 
significant, b = 0.38, SE = 0.19, t(458) = 2.02, p = .022 (one-tailed). We probed the effect of 
attitudinal dissimilarity for participants who are relatively intolerant of political ambiguity (one 
standard deviation above the mean) and participants who are relatively tolerant of political 
ambiguity (one standard deviation below the mean) in the two experimental conditions. 
The analysis for participants who are relatively intolerant of political ambiguity did not 
provide evidence for the effectiveness of the writing task condition in influencing the association 
between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice. The attitudinal dissimilarity × writing task 
condition interaction effect was non-significant, b = 0.03, SE = 0.06, t(470) = 0.49, p = .623. The 
size of the slopes are plotted in Figure 3. For participants who are relatively intolerant of political 
ambiguity in the reason generation condition, the effect of attitudinal dissimilarity was strong and 
significant, b = 0.24, SE = 0.04, t(471) = 5.53, p < .001. For participants who are relatively 
intolerant of political ambiguity in the mechanism explanation condition, the effect of attitudinal 
dissimilarity was also strong and significant, b = 0.27, SE = 0.05, t(468) = 6.01, p < .001. 
There was a non-significant trend for participants who are tolerant of political ambiguity that the 
relationship between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice was weaker in the mechanism 
explanation condition than in the reason generation condition. The attitudinal dissimilarity × 
writing task condition interaction effect was not significant, b = -0.09, SE = 0.06, t(470) = -1.53, 
p = .063 (one-tailed). For participants who are relatively tolerant of political ambiguity in the 
reason generation condition, the effect of attitudinal dissimilarity was strong and significant, b = 
0.29, SE = 0.04, t(468) = 7.35, p < .001. For participants who are relatively tolerant of political 
ambiguity in the mechanism explanation condition, the effect of attitudinal dissimilarity was also  
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Figure 3: The Unstandardized Beta (and 95% Confidence Intervals) of Perceived 
Attitudinal Dissimilarity on Prejudice Depending on Writing Task Condition and Intolerance of 
Political Ambiguity 
 
strong and significant, b = 0.20, SE = 0.04, t(471) = 4.66, p < .001. Figure 3 plots these two 
simple effects of dissimilarity. Although the three-way interaction was significant and in the 
predicted direction, the subsequent two-way interaction effect did not surpass our pre-registered 
alpha level of .05 (one-tailed). In total, the hypothesis is not supported. 
Indirect effects. Both indirect effects were non-significant, Sobel test for mediation via 
strength of moral convictions: z = -0.22, p = .587 (one-tailed); Sobel test for mediation via 
intolerance of political ambiguity: z = 1.21, p = .113 (one-tailed). The direct effect, that is the 
three-way interaction of attitudinal dissimilarity, writing task condition, and ideological 
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extremity, remained not significant in the mediation model, b = 0.01, SE = 0.02, t(462) = 0.36, p 
= .715. 
Additional analyses: Differences in dissimilarity ratings (Preregistered). We tested 
whether political ideology and/or ideological extremity affect how dissimilar participants view 
the 30 social groups. In the initial study, we did not find such an effect (see supplementary 
materials). In the proposed study, we also tested for such an effect. Therefore, we conducted a 
multilevel analysis with two different levels. Level 2 was constituted by the subjects and Level 1 
was constituted by the social groups that we used for our measures of attitudinal dissimilarity and 
prejudices. We included the attitudinal dissimilarity variable as dependent variable (rescaled to 
range from 0 to 1, higher ratings indicating higher perceived attitudinal dissimilarity). In addition, 
we included fixed effects for (a) ideological extremity (the absolute value of the political 
ideology variable, ranging from 0 to 5, higher ratings indicating a more extreme political 
ideology), and (b) type of ideology (conservative coded as -1, moderate coded as 0, and liberal 
coded as 1). Further, we included a fixed effect for the two -way interaction between these 
variables as well as a random intercept. We expected to find no significant main or interaction 
effects. 
We found a weak but significant effect of ideological extremity on perceived attitudinal 
dissimilarity, b = -0.01, SE = 0.00, t(489) = -2.16, p = .031. Surprisingly, participants with a more 
extreme ideology perceived the social groups as less dissimilar overall. The interaction effect and 
the main effect of ideological type were non-significant (both ps > .266). 
Robustness check (Preregistered). We examined the robustness of the results of the 
main and mediation analyses by including fixed main effects for gender (using two dummy 
variables for female and other; male as reference category), age (grand-mean centered), and 
education (grand-mean centered). The robustness check repeated the non-significant effects. 
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Controlling for gender, age, and education, the attitudinal dissimilarity × writing task condition × 
ideological extremity interaction effect remained non-significant b = 0.01, SE = 0.02, t(466) = 
0.34, p = .369 (one-tailed). The predicted indirect effects remained non-significant as well, Sobel 
test for mediation via strength of moral convictions: z = -0.22, p = .585 (one-tailed); Sobel test for 
mediation via intolerance of political ambiguity: z = 1.21, p = .114 (one-tailed). 
In short, across all of the confirmatory analyses we did not find support for our 
hypotheses. Although attitudinal dissimilarity was robustly associated with prejudice, replicating 
decades of past work on the topic, this link was not reduced in size for political moderates by 
puncturing the illusion of explanatory depth. 
Exploratory Analyses 
Change in Understanding – Potential Moderators. We conducted exploratory analyses 
to test whether our manipulation worked only for some subgroups or across the board. Therefore, 
we added main effects and two-way interactions effects with the writing task condition for 
ideological extremity, strength of moral conviction, and intolerance of political ambiguity to the 
model. However, all of these effects were non-significant (p > .098). That is, we did not find 
evidence that the change in understanding ratings depended on any of our proposed moderators. 
Simplifying Main Model. We conducted additional exploratory analyses in which we 
removed all non-significants effects from our main model. All interaction effects involving the 
writing task condition and its main effect were non-significant (all ps > .115). Thus, the final 
model consisted of two main effects for attitudinal dissimilarity and ideological extremity and 
their interaction effect.  
This interaction effect was significant, b = 0.03, SE = 0.01, t(469) = 3.94, p < .001. For 
moderates, the effect of attitudinal dissimilarity on prejudice was strong and significant, b = 0.24, 
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SE = 0.03, t(482) = 9.18, p < .001. For extremists, the effect of attitudinal dissimilarity on 
prejudice was even stronger, b = 0.41, SE = 0.02, t(455) = 16.31, p < .001. 
Simplified Mediation Model. In addition, we conducted exploratory analyses in which 
we removed all non-significants effects from our mediation model. The attitudinal dissimilarity × 
writing task condition × ideological extremity interaction effect, the attitudinal dissimilarity × 
writing task condition × strength of moral conviction interaction effect, the writing task condition 
× ideological extremity interaction effect, and the writing task condition × strength of moral 
conviction interaction effect were non-significant (all ps > .708) and removed from the model. 
Thus, the final model consisted of five main effects (attitudinal dissimilarity, writing task 
condition, ideological extremity, strength of moral conviction, and intolerance of political 
ambiguity), five two-way interaction effects (attitudinal dissimilarity × writing task condition, 
attitudinal dissimilarity × ideological extremity, attitudinal dissimilarity × strength of moral 
conviction, attitudinal dissimilarity × intolerance of political ambiguity, and writing task 
condition × intolerance of political ambiguity) and one three-way interaction effect (attitudinal 
dissimilarity × writing task condition × intolerance of political ambiguity).  
The attitudinal dissimilarity × writing task condition × intolerance of political ambiguity 
interaction effect remained significant, b = 0.39, SE = 0.18, t(460) = 2.09, p = .019 (one-tailed). 
The attitudinal dissimilarity × ideological extremity also remained significant, b = 0.03, SE = 
0.01, t(464) = 3.19, p = .002. In addition, the attitudinal dissimilarity × strength of moral 
conviction interaction effect was also significant, b = 0.27, SE = 0.08, t(476) = 3.23, p = .001. For 
participants with relatively weak moral convictions, the effect of attitudinal dissimilarity on 
prejudice was strong and significant, b = 0.20, SE = 0.03, t(485) = 7.17, p < .001. For participants 
with relatively strong moral convictions, the effect of attitudinal dissimilarity on prejudice was 
even stronger, b = 0.30, SE = 0.03, t(469) = 9.25, p < .001. 
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Moderator: Ideological Type. For our confirmatory main analyses, we did not include 
the attitudinal dissimilarity × writing task condition × ideological type interaction effect because 
it did not meet our pre-registered criterion of statistical significance (p < .05). However, 
considering that we found tentative evidence for a moderating effect of ideological type in our 
earlier study and as the effect was close to significance in the analysis leading up to our main 
model (p = .067), we decided to explore it in more detail. Therefore, we added the attitudinal 
dissimilarity × writing task condition × ideological type interaction effect and the corresponding 
lower-order main and interaction effects to the simplified main model. 
The attitudinal dissimilarity × writing task condition × ideological type interaction effect 
was not significant, b = -0.06, SE = 0.04, t(460) = -1.75, p = .082. Similarly, the attitudinal 
dissimilarity × writing task condition interaction effect was not significant for both conservatives, 
b = 0.07, SE = 0.06, t(462) = 1.18, p = .239, and liberals, b = -0.06, SE = 0.04, t(463) = -1.55, p = 
.121. That is, puncturing the illusion of explanatory depth did not appear to reduce the 
relationship between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice for neither liberals nor conservatives. 
Discussion 
The relationship between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice is one of the most robust 
relationships in social psychology (Brandt et al., 2014, 2015; Byrne, 1969; Byrne & Nelson, 
1965). In this research, we replicated this effect. However, we also hypothesised and tested the 
effectiveness of puncturing the illusion of explanatory depth for reducing the strength of, or even 
breaking, this relationship. In an initial study, we found support for this hypothesis for political 
moderates but not for political extremists. In the main study, we aimed to replicate this effect and 
tested whether it would be mediated by two potential psychological characteristics of moderates: 
relatively weak moral convictions and relatively high tolerance of political ambiguity. 
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The results of the main study did not provide support for the idea that either political 
moderates or extremists who have had their illusion of explanatory depth punctionured become 
more tolerant of other people perceived as being attitudinally dissimilar from themselves. 
Similarly, we found no evidence for such an effect among people with relatively strong or weak 
moral convictions or people who identify as politically conservative or liberal. 
The result for intolerance of political ambiguity needs additional elaboration. We found a 
significant moderating effect of intolerance of political ambiguity for the attitudinal dissimilarity 
× writing task condition in the predicted direction. However, the predicted attitudinal 
dissimilarity × writing task condition interaction effect for participants who are relatively tolerant 
of political ambuity was not significant (i.e. the simple effect was not significant). Notably, the 
magnitude of this effect was substantial, but the effect was unreliable. This issue may stem from 
the fact the items from the adapted scale that we used to measure intolerance of political 
ambiguity were considerably less reliable than we expected. 
Although a failure to reject the null hypothesis is difficult to interpret, our conservative 
power analyses suggested that we had at least a 80% chance of finding a statistically significant 
three-way interaction effect of small size and a near 100% chance of finding a statistically 
significant three-way interaction effect of a medium size, assuming such an effect exists. Thus, 
we cannot rule out that our study was a false negative and puncturing of the illusion of 
explanatory depth does reduce the relationship between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice for 
political moderates or people with weak moral convictions. However, if our power analyses are 
correct and restricted to the population of MTurkers, it is highly unlikely that such effects are of 
medium or strong size. At best, these effects are small, which may limit their practical utility for 
concrete real-world interventions. 
Digging Deeper: Which Processes Could Be at Work 
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An important starting point for this discussion is that we did find that participants in the 
mechanism explanation condition, but not in the reason generation condition, showed statistically 
significant drops in estimates of what they believed they understood. That is, the manipulation 
worked as expected. Therefore, the reason the predicted effects were not found must lay 
somewhere else. 
Our theoretical approach hypothesized a reduction-effect of the puncturing of explanatory 
depth manipulation for political moderates. However, it could be possible that puncturing the 
illusion of explanatory depth activates multiple processes that simultaneously strengthen and 
weaken the association between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice. For example, social 
identity and realistic group conflict theories suggest a relationship between ingroup-identification 
and outgroup hostility under conditions of intergroup threat (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998). If 
participants realize that the basis of their preference for their ingroup over outgroups is less 
warranted than previously thought, they may react with increased hostility towards the outgroup 
(cf. Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). Such a process may cancel out the effect that we 
hypothesized. Including measures of ingroup identification and perceived intergroup threat in 
future studies could help to disentangle these potentially opposing effects. 
In addition, the prejudice literature suggests alternative subgroups for which the proposed 
intervention might be more of less effective. For example, the need for cognitive closure is 
closely related to intolerance of political ambiguity. It is defined as “a desire for an answer on a 
given topic, any answer, . . . compared to confusion and ambiguity" (Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994, p. 1049). This desire has been identified as the general motivated cognitive style 
underlying prejudice (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). When we proposed the mediators for our study, 
we argued that intolerance of political ambiguity might be a better choice than need for cognitive 
closure as it is specific to the political domain. However, our results for intolerance of political 
I KNOW THAT I KNOW NOTHING   31 
ambiguity must be treated with caution due to the low reliability coefficient for the scale that we 
adapted from previous research (McClosky & Chong, 1985). Validated scales to measure the 
more general need for closure (e.g., Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b) propose a way to both addressing 
our reliability issue and extending our results to a more general style of avoiding versus 
embracing ambiguity.  
A second possibility for future research is to investigate honesty-humility as a potential 
moderator. Honesty-humility is a dimension of the HEXACO model of personalit structure. It 
“reflects an orientation towards fairness and sincerity in social relations versus the tendency to 
manipulate and use people for whatever one can get from them" (Sibley, Harding, Perry, 
Asbrock, & Duckitt, 2010, p. 517). Past research has identified a complex role for honesty-
humility as a contributor to prejudice (Bergh & Akrami, 2016; Sibley et al., 2010; Stuermer et al., 
2013). However, if people with a honest and humble personality are particularly concerned about 
treating other social groups fairly, they might be especially likely to become more tolerant of 
dissimilar others when realizing that they overestimated their understanding of important 
policies. 
One common assumption throughout this “digging deeper” discussion is that puncturing 
the illusion of explanatory depth can reduce the link between dissimilarity and prejudice for at 
least some people through some mechanisms. However, it is important to be clear that this an 
assumption for the sake of discussion. It is also possible that puncturing the illusion of 
explanatory depth does not reduce the association between dissimilarity and prejudice. Future 
researchers should procede with caution. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Our research presents several limitations. First, although Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
samples are of similar (if not better) quality than other convenience samples like college students, 
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it is not representative of any population (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, 
& Gosling, 2011; Huff & Tingley, 2015; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). Our sample consisted of 
American MTurkers because our priority was on having enough power to detect the effect we had 
hypothesized. Considering the large sample size we pursued, MTurk provides a platform to 
conduct our study within a reasonable cost and time frame. However, as MTurk is a US based 
platform that is usually liberally skewed (i.e. there are more liberal than conservative MTurkers; 
Berinsky et al., 2012; Huff & Tingley, 2015), our findings are limited to this sample. Future 
research could examine whether puncturing the illusion of explanatory depth successfully reduces 
the relationship between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice in countries with a multipolar or 
with less polarized political scene than in the US. 
Second, in both the initial and the main study, our study suffered from high dropout rates. 
In addition, the dropout rate was significantly higher in the mechanism explanation condition 
than in the reason generation condition. Similar differences were also observed in both of 
Fernbach et al.’s (2013) studies. This finding might be problematic, because if certain types of 
people are more likely to drop out in one condition than in another, researchers can no longer 
assume that the principle of random assignment ensures no non-random a priori differences 
between the experimental conditions (Zhou & Fishnbach, 2016). Future methodological research 
should aim to modify the mechanism generation intervention in order to counter these high 
dropout rates. 
Finally, another direction for future research is to examine whether the consequences of 
realizing that one knows less about the mechanisms of policy interventions than one initially 
assumes change over time. Other research has suggested that attitudinal dissimilarity becomes 
more important in influencing group cohesiveness over time as group members accumulate more 
information about each other (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998). We propose that reducing the effect 
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of dissimilarity on prejudice may similarly take time. While realizing that one knows less than 
one thought might be painful or unpleasant in the first moment, and one might want to devalue 
other, dissimilar groups, people may, in the long run, question the basis for their prejudice and 
learn to be more tolerant towards others from their illusion of explanatory depth. Thus, studies 
could compare the short-term and the long-term effects of puncturing the illusion of explanatory 
depth.  
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Appendix 
List of Social Groups 
Whites  Democrats  Blacks   Poor   Middle class 
Asians  Rich   Atheists  Republicans  Christians 
Liberals Conservatives  Nerds   Students  Athletes 
Jews  Hispanics  Women  Artists   Musicians 
Teenagers Muslims  Politicians  Catholics  Men 
Jocks  Preps   Elderly  Business people White-collar 
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